Washington's strategic choices than on Beijing's." 6 For Charles Glaser, realism, when properly understood, offers grounds for optimism in this case, so long as Washington can avoid exaggerating the risks posed by China's growing power. 7 During the Cold War, " [t] hose who feared that the United States could not extend its deterrent to Western Europe believed that the Soviet Union was a highly revisionist state bent on radically overturning the status quo and willing to run enormous risks in the process. There is virtually no evidence suggesting that China has such ambitious goals." 8 Studies more based on empirical analysis have also raised doubts and find that evidence points to a different assessment. 9 Alastair Iain Johnston explores the degree to which China's leaders are pursuing status quo or revisionist foreign policies and concludes that it is hard to conclude that China is a clearly revisionist state operating outside, or barely inside, the boundaries of a so-called international community. In forty-odd years China moved from being a revolutionary revisionist state to a more status quo-oriented one. other than those of Mao, show that they are not offensive realists.
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A similar conclusion has been reached with emphasis on the constraints on China's action. Evan S. Medeiros argues that, "China, in sum, is not trying to tear down or radically revise the current constellation of global rules, norms, and institutions on economic and security affairs". 12 In the meantime, China's role as an agenda-and rule-setter will only become a more prominent feature of its diplomacy in the future. To date, however, China's actual record in the shaping of international rules and institutions has been limited and episodic. "As China's capabilities grow," he further argues, "the internal constraint and external restraints on a revisionist turn in China's foreign and defense policies remain substantial, and some of them will increase." 13 By examining China's joining in the different security institutions, Johnston's Social States argues that China has been socialized in those institutions to become more cooperative in those security institutions. His conclusions in fact point to the direction of China as a status quo power. 14 China's compliance with and observing the rules of the game in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the past decade are perhaps another example.
This paper explores China's approaches to the international system from the lens of the relationship between China and the G20 and how that is related to the reform of the international monetary system (IMS). The findings lead to my conclusion that China is basically a status quo power but at the same time is reformed-minded, wishing for constructive changes it perceives. In general, China is satisfied with its status in the international system, while is hoping for improved world political and economic governance through participation in the international institutions such as the G20 and by playing a proactive role in them.
Between Status Quo and Reform
Different people give different answers to the question whether China is an advocate of the status quo, a modest reformer, or an anti-status quo reformer. To respond to the question we need a working definition. After having discussed the limited analysis to date that Hans Morgenthau, Robert Gilpin and others have conducted on "status quo" and found no satisfactory answers, Johnston made a contribution by having developed a set of indicators to assess whether an actor is a status quo seeker. Those five indicators move from the least challenging to the most challenging to the status quo, and they are further grouped into two sets. 15 The first set is especially illuminating, which include degree of participation, acceptance of the norms of the community, and desire for change when possible, for the case 13 Ibid, 255-256. 14 For Barry Buzan, peaceful rise is possible in international society. This involves a two-way process in which the rising power accommodates itself to rules and structures of international society, while at the same time other powers accommodate some changes in those rules and structures by way of adjusting to the new disposition of power and status. 16 This is to say, peaceful rise does not exclude involvement of rule change, so long as this is made not through force or coercion, but rather through mutual accommodation. A.F.K.
Organski and Jacek Kugler defined status quo states as those that have participated in designing the "rules of the game" and stand to benefit from these rules. For them, only rising states that want to change the rules as the power distribution changes are non-status quo powers. 17 The question is what "rules of the game" refer to? What if a declining power is seeking rules of game change? How about Japan with regard to the issue of permanent membership of UN Security Council? While a declining Japan seeks change, is it a non-status quo state?
It seems too narrow to define a status quo power as a rising power that whole-heartedly accepts the existing rules without any aspiration for rule change. We can hardly find historical examples. History may stand on the side that all rising powers seek rule change one way or another. The real question is in what way a rising power seeks rule change.
Fundamentally different from Germany and Japan between the First and Second World War, during which they attempted to overthrow the status quo by way of annexation and invasion, and eventually by waging an all-out war, China's behaviors in the recent decades suggest that today's China first learns the rules of game and apply them, at the same time seeks rule change where it finds unfair and unreasonable, through accommodation, negotiation, and consensus-building.
Basically, a status quo state accepts the existing rules of the game and it does not seek to change them since generally it is satisfied with the current situation. changes so as to defend the current rules. On the contrary, an anti-status quo state is strongly de-satisfied with the existing rules, explicit or implicit, and seeks to overthrow them as the guiding norms for state behaviors. A reform-minded status quo state sits in between. Overall, such a state is satisfied with the current situation and accepts the existing rules. In the meantime, it holds that there are shortcomings in the present order and hopes those things to be improved for a better order. However, it seeks changes on the basis of the present rules of the game that it has accepted and endorsed. A reform-minded status state wants to make the desirable changes in an incremental rather than radical or revolutionary way, likely over a long time span. This often requires it to work with other actors to build consensus in terms of approach. In this sense, it is often much more multilateralism-oriented rather than resorting to unilateral actions.
Earlier on, China was faced with an emerging question whether it should pursue a membership or accept an invitation to join the G8. As China was rising economically as well as politically in the world, such a possibility was repeatedly raised around the turn of the century, 18 mostly in an informal way, in the form of discussing whether G8 should be turned into G9 by bringing China in (or into G10 by further adding India). In this context, internal meetings were held within the Chinese government bodies to deliberate this issue 19 and a conclusion was reached, i.e., China should not seek to join G8 or accept such an invitation due to two overriding reasons. The first had much to do with China's self-identification as a developing country. For Beijing, such a membership would not be perceived positively in the developing world, since this would likely be seen as a major move to join the group of Western powers, and thus a fundamental change of self-identity as well as changes of long-held position and policies. China's key foreign policy principle of "developing countries are the basis" would be affected, and this would be too high a price to pay for Beijing.
Second, no matter whether it was G8 or G9, such a grouping would anyhow be dominated by the Western powers. Being a junior partner could by no means be acceptable for China. Mexico. This formula made the +5 appeared collectively as a group of which China was a part. In this case, China did not have to worry about being singled out and it could also take advantage of this opportunity to conduct its emerging power diplomacy. However, for
Beijing, particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, since the dialogues always occurred in places where the G8 summits were held, dialogue arrangements, agenda setting, and outcome design were all controlled by the G8, whereas the developing powers largely had to accept them. In this sense, the two groups were not equal. procedures, but also take into account the development stages and characteristics of different economies. Second, it needs to be a balanced reform based on overall consideration, seeks a balance among the interests of all parties and builds a decision-making and management mechanism with wider and more effective participation. Third, it needs to be an incremental reform that seeks gradual progress and should proceed in a phased manner, starting with the easier issues, and achieve the final objectives of reform through sustained efforts under the precondition of maintaining stability of the international financial market. Fourth, it needs to be a pragmatic reform, one that stresses practical results. All reform measures should contribute to the international financial stability, the global economic growth, and the welfare of people in all countries.
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Moreover, China proposed four reform measures, including advancing reform of the international financial organizations and increasing the representation and say of the developing countries in them, as well as improving the international currency system and steadily promoting the diversity of the international monetary system. From the beginning of the G20 summits, China underscored that when coping with the financial crisis, the international community should pay particular attention to the damage of the crisis has brought to the developing countries. China proposed three measures to be taken, namely, helping developing countries maintain financial stability and economic growth; sustaining and increasing assistance to developing countries; and maintaining economic and financial stability in those countries.
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Between the Washington and London summits, stabilizing the world economy and preventing it from further slipping into chaos were inevitably the G20's top priority, while reforming the international monetary system and strengthening the financial surveillance system were put high on the agenda. China was positive. 
The Five Key Issues

Reform of the international monetary system
The issue of the international monetary system reform is not new. As early as in Finance, Mr. Li Guanghui, argued that the reform of the international monetary system has three levels. First, at the national level, the international reserve currency-issuing countries bear a special responsibility for global economic stability. They should take into consideration the external impact of their own macro-economic policies, and, through appropriate macro policy coordination, they should maintain the relative stability of exchange rate between the major reserve currencies. For Zhou, the crisis again called for creative reform of the existing international monetary system towards an international reserve currency with a stable value, rule-based issuance and manageable supply, so as to achieve the objective of safeguarding global economic and financial stability. That international reserve currency has to be disconnected from any individual nation and be able to remain stable in the long run, thus removing the inherent deficiencies caused by using credit-based national currencies. Special consideration should be given to giving the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) a greater role by broadening the scope of using the SDR, setting up a settlement system between the SDR and other currencies, finance minister, as their preferred candidate to succeed Strauss-Kahn, 45 she realized that she could not ignore the voice from the BRICS nations, especially China, given its economic weight. Lagarde repeatedly promised while campaigning for the job to give more power to emerging markets in the IMF, and she backed a bigger role for China at the organization.
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While she successfully received support from Beijing, appointing a Chinese national for a more formal, high-level executive position was put on the table. While a fourth deputy managing director was added to the senior management team, Mr. Zhu Min, special advisor to the managing director, was appointed in July 2011. This was the first time in the IMF history a Chinese citizen was appointed deputy managing director and was, thus, a breakthrough for China.
International Financial Regulation
The global financial crisis has strikingly revealed the problems with the current financial regulation system which was not working well to prevent financial malpractice and to avoid a rating system. At the summit, China underscored the need to develop an objective, fair, reasonable, and uniformed method and standard for sovereign credit rating, so that rating results can accurately reflect a country's situation as well as its level of credit risk. The supervision of credit rating agencies should be enforced and the regulations and accountability system on credit rating agencies should be strengthened. 51 What was not touched upon here was how China's own rating agencies should be forged and become internationally recognized.
According to Guan Jianzhong, chairman and CEO of Dagong Global Credit Rating Co
Ltd., China's most internationalized rating agency, the current international credit rating system must take part of the blame for the crisis, and reforming that system is key to global credit recovery. The dominance of developed countries in the rating system is one reason the global credit and financial crisis hit in the first place: the developed countries assigned themselves the highest credit rating against their actual solvency, concealing their credit risks from investors, and thereby setting off the big credit bomb globally. 52 The three major U.S.
rating agencies -Moody's, Standard & Poor, and Fitch -have betrayed international investors and their interests, proving yet again that they are the faithful servants of the biggest debtor nations. This situation has to be changed in the years ahead.
The Future of the Dollar
Once again, the crisis has cast doubt on the future role of the US dollar as the most dominant key currency. Most participants in a March 2010 international conference on the future global reserve system held in Tokyo, Japan agreed that, although with a diminishing weight, the US dollar will remain the main reserve currency well into the future. dollar. 57 Responding to the commentary that the BRICS countries are conducting "de-dollarization," one Chinese observer argued that actually it is dollar itself which is doing "de-dollarization", by referring to QE which pushed down the credibility of the dollar, the biggest international reserve currency, and led to the exacerbation of the externally imposed global inflation. 58 This kind of action has brought the whole world to the attention that at the end of the day dollar is the biggest factor for global instability, and the dollar-dominated international monetary system (IMS) has to be constrained and reformed. Deviating from the dollar systemic risks is not only the creditors' interest, but also the way-out for a stable and sustainable global financial system. should be kept at a reasonable and stable level." 61 Carefully phrased, it is not desirable for China to let its destiny be determined by a foreign country and its policies, which can likely be conducted at the expense of other countries' interests.
What is the right and viable approach? It is a consensus that a gradual approach should be adopted to allow IMS to have more participation, to allow more currencies to prop up the system, fuller representation, and more effective operating mechanism. However, the progress in this regard eventually depends on the shifting balance of power, interests and interactions among the world's economic and political powers.
For Beijing, it is determined to proactively participate in the IMS reform for more involvement and more access to be better informed and have bigger say. In the short run, China needs to, under the current frameworks of IMS with dollar at its core, actively play a part in the G20 efforts for global economic recovery, to promote international cooperation, and to improve the concrete institutional arrangements within the current IMS frameworks.
There is something China can do. For Yu, "The lack of alternatives to the dollar as a reserve currency has bred a false sense of security in the US. Yet when China reduces its current surplus (and diversifies from dollar assets) the effects would be felt in the US Treasury markets." "China's development is putting to an end the period of unquestioned western supremacy." 62 Chinese policymakers would never be that straight forward as they are aware how daunting their tasks are down the road toward a developed country status. They do not want China to appear to be challenging the U.S. and to attempt to substitute the current IMS with anything like a fundamentally different one. With this state of mind, they are careful in taking initiatives, or measures that may appear to deliberately weaken the status of the dollar.
This explains China's low profile in hosting the G20 symposium on IMS reform during French President Sarkozy's visit to China.
As the host nation of the 2011 G20 summit, France was keen to push IMS reform forward, the centerpiece of France's agenda for its G20 presidency, and, given China's rising status, would like to work in tandem with the latter. Yet Beijing was cautious not to appear to 61 A full transcript is available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/16/AR2011011601921.html. 62 Yu Yongding, "China's best way forward," Financial Times 19 January, 2011, p. 11.
want to overthrow the current order. To show the symposium was "informal and academic", 63 it decided to hold the event in Nanjing, outside the capital city, in March 2011, with the participation of a number of G20 finance ministers and central bankers. In fact, later Sarkozy watered down his tone and proposals, a result of his U.S. visit early that year during which he raised bold IMS reform without receiving U.S. backing. 64 This in turn reflected the usefulness of China's keeping low profile.
Internationalization of the Renminbi
Theoretically, given China's prominence in world trade, in manufacturing, and increasingly in financing as well, it would be logical for the Renminbi to become one of three or four major international currencies in the global economy. As of June 2011, China's share of world trade was 11 percent, but the Renminbi's share of global foreign exchange trading that year was only 0.9 percent. Unsurprisingly, the Renminbi internationalization has become China's objective. The benefits of making the Renminbi an international currency include less need for China to hold US dollar assets so as to avoid risking capital losses, the elimination of exchange rate risks for Chinese firms, greater funding efficiency for Chinese financial institutions, and the promotion of Shanghai as an international financial center. The yuan becoming an international currency would be in China's medium and long term interests, while in the immediate term, trade settlement in yuan helps mitigate exchange risk and reduce transaction costs for enterprises trading with China. 65 However, in some quarters, "the debate over the role of the US dollar and the emergence of the RMB is seen as threats to the status quo." 66 For Fred Bergsten, the rise of China implies the Renminbi will qualify for global currency status, thus he has a different view which anticipates the emergence of Renminbi as one of the three global currencies. The IMS is already becoming bipolar, and may soon be tri-polar, meaning the dollar, the euro, and the yuan in lead. The US should accept this and even promote its acceleration. 
The G20 and Global Economic Governance
The world is changing rapidly. As Robert Zoellick, President of the World Bank, points out, "The international economy is shifting to a new multipolarity. About half of global growth is now from developing economies and this will transform power relations. 
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For China, first, the G20 is an important platform. G20 emerged from the backdrop when the Western countries were widely held responsible for the outbreak of the financial crisis and the G8 was incapable to singularly cope with it. When G20 at the summit level was born, for the first time major developing countries were engaged in global economic governance on a more equal footing. This has been a significant development and has provided a rare opportunity for major emerging countries, and China should actively participate in the process. participate in global economic governance on an equal footing. The emerging economies will obtain more representation and vantage point.
Third, make G20 a long-term effective mechanism. After the Pittsburg summit, G20 started a process of establishing regulations and building institutions (jianzhang lizhi), and entered into a transition from a crisis-fighting to a long-term mechanism for hopefully effective global economic governance. This development has far-reaching implications as it has preliminarily changed the situation in which for many years the developed countries monopolized international economic affairs, and has helped upgrade developing countries' rights to say in them. It is beneficial for China to participate in global governance in a wider platform and to defend China's own as well as many developing countries' legitimate interests.
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Fourth, there are three outstanding questions that need to be resolved. One is the issue of legitimacy. The concerns of those non-G20 nations need to be addressed and their interests taken into consideration. Second is the G20 has to be effective. G20 bears the characteristics of hastiness to combat emergencies. When the crisis subsided, clashes of different interests and aspirations would likely emerge and thus pose challenges for the G20 states to continue coordinating their actions or policies for better governing global economic affairs. A third one is the power distribution issue. Schemes have to be worked out for proper and improved arrangements regarding financial regulation, share management, and voting power distribution in the IFIs. Beijing has been aware that this will take time and will be undergoing a long, complex, and even tortuous process. This was proved to be right given the intense controversies and fights over China's exchange rate policy, especially before the Seoul summit.
In short, China wants the status of G20 as the premier global economic governance platform to be consolidated, and further turns China's influence into institutional power. By adequately and reasonably taking advantage of its newly increased institutional power in the international governing organizations such as the IMF and World Bank, Beijing hopes to effectively safeguard and expand its development interests, and to shape favorable institutional environment for its participation in international economic cooperation and 81 Interview with a government official on April 21, 2011.
competition at a higher level.
Conclusion
Today, China has increasingly become a pluralistic society. More and more actors are now involved in the foreign policy decision-making process. In the case of China in the G20, while local governments are not involved, there are different bureaucratic organizations which are playing a role, prominent among them include Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA),
Ministry of Finance, and the People's Bank of China, i.e., China's central bank. There has been policy coordination between them, and, although there is a rare example of their difference on creating a "supra-sovereign currency", our research does not find major policy differences among them regarding China's involvement in the G20 process. This is likely due to relatively clear-cut portfolios and policy terrains. Also, the Finance Minister and the central bank governor often attend the same meetings together, such as the joint IMF and World Bank meetings. With respect to the research community, quite often there are different views, but they do not seem to differ greatly on the issue of G20.
As is defined at the beginning of this paper, a reform-minded status quo power sits somewhere between rigid and anti-status quo powers. A status quo state accepts the existing rules of the game and it does not seek to change them because generally it is satisfied with the current situation. China has benefited from the existing international system and has continued to rise to the world's second largest economy status. Logically, it does not aspire to overthrow this system within which it is doing well. In this sense, China is indeed a status quo power. Meanwhile, it is not true that China rigidly sticks to this existing system and wants it to remain unchanged. Rather, China has been arguing that the current international order is flawed and there exist a number of unjust and unreasonable components. 82 They long need to be changed. In this sense, China is not a complete but rather a reform-minded status quo power.
This paper has analyzed the case of China in the G20 process and has examined China's position and policies on relevant issues, including the IMS reform, reform of the IFIs, international financial regulation, the future of the dollar, and internationalization of the renminbi. My findings demonstrate that China has actively participated in the G20's deliberations and actions, put forward its suggestions, sought expanded share and voting power in the IFIs in correspondence with its rising status, and promoted the internationalization of the renminbi. In other words, while having accepted and observed the current international rules of the game, China seeks changes for greater institutional power and for better global governance. This aspiration became stronger when it appeared that China has fallen into the "dollar pitfall" in which China is "abducted" by the large reservoir of the U.S. treasury bonds it has purchased and accumulated, as the value of which is determined by the U.S. domestic policy decisions. When the dollar devalues, China's dollar assets shrink. This real risk prompted Beijing's desire for a new international reserve currency that is independent from a particular nation's policies, though China's Foreign
Ministry claimed it was China's official policy.
China's approaches to the changes it seeks are reformist rather than revolutionary. In this regard, there are two features. One is incrementalism, namely, being patient and attempting to bring about changes gradually over a fairly long period. The other is consensus-based. China is prepared to seek consensus in the multilateral settings, working with other actors and joining global economic governance. After all, governance is a collective endeavor. Crisis usually drives changes. The G20's being elevated to the summit level and its rise to prominence were a product of the global financial crisis when the G8 was unable to fight the crisis alone. Against this backdrop countries had to join hands to collectively combat the crisis and further to explore the necessities of reform. After all, the developing powers are rising. Due to these reasons, the G20 process inevitably bears the color of reform.
Nevertheless, on the issue of United Nations Security Council reform, as one of the permanent five members that possess veto power and thus has a vested interest, China is more rigid and reluctant to expand veto power to other nations. This is not very different from, in fact shared by, other two permanent members, the United States and Russia. If one looks at this case of the UN Security Council reform only, one could easily come to the conclusion that China is a rigid status quo seeker. However, facts combined do not lead us to such an argument. On this particular issue of Security Council reform, China's position has 31 much to do with Japan's ambition for a permanent seat and with Sino-Japanese relationship.
Let us not lose sight of the forest while looking at the trees. China has been espousing necessary changes for a "new international political and economic order." When that sounded too revisionist and being aware that China was a benefactor of the existing order, Beijing opted for a more moderate rhetoric "pushing international order to change in the direction of becoming more just and reasonable." With that in mind, China carefully wants to avoid being seen as anti-status quo and to demonstrate a realistic attitude. In the meantime, China does have ideals and wishes for a better world. For example, it wishes for more even distribution of power between established and emerging powers, better treatments of the less developed countries, and fairer representation of different kinds of countries in terms of level of development. In general, China espouses constructive reforms while accepting the existing rules and wanting to integrate into the world further. What China has been practicing within the G20 proves this well.
